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1 Introduction
The debate on basic income (henceforth BI) seems to be contra-cyclical. The
underlying reason for the coming and going of BI in and out of the picture,
is the relationship between the welfare state and unemployment. In periods
of recession, e.g. the 1930s, and late 1970s and early 1980s, there are more
discussions about BI than in periods of économie prosperity (e.g. during the
so-called Golden Age of capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s). If unemployment
is high and to a large extent involuntary, the policy to push the unemployed
to accept (non-existent) jobs or to curtail social benefîts becomes highly
controversial, and as a corollary, forms of BI (a négative income tax,
or a participation income) become more fashionable. Unemployment, in
particularly large scale and long lasting unemployment, can safely be
considered as one of the greatest problems for social policy makers. In
the literature concerning the labour market and social policy, one not only
finds théories that try to explain unemployment, but also many proposais
to reduce or eliminate unemployment. Thèse vary from piece-meal social-
engineering approaches (e.g., cutting back social benefit and minimum wage
levels, providing wage subsidies to low-waged labour), workfare-oriented
approaches, to proposais which envisage an entirely différent institutional
framework of the labour market (e.g. Weitzman's (1984) Share Economy).
Whereas social policy makers and politicians must face the problems
of the day, theorists hâve the prérogative and opportunity to indulge in
fantasies and utopias. Behind their desk they can construct imaginary
societies with institutions we never had the opportunity to expérience in the
real world. The BI proposai is such an imaginary construct. It would mean a
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major break with the means-tested and work-related social security Systems
now in force in most Western-European countries.1 Some even speak of a
new paradigm of social security based on the notion of fairness, beyond the
présent welfare state based on the principles of (Bismarckian) insurance and
(Beveridgean) solidarity.2 In the literature about BI, the link between BI (or
the équivalent négative income tax) and unemployment is not scrutinized,
despite the strong corrélation between the intensity of the debate on BI as
an alternative to the présent, conditional, scheme of social security and the
unemployment rate.3
The main aim of this paper is to make plausible the claim that to the
extent a BI can be justified by giving everyone equal and tradable claims
to scarce job assets, the case for a BI is stronger, and that the level of
BI should be higher, the higher the level of structural unemployment.4
Structural unemployment is taken hère in a broad sensé : it refers to an
objective shortage of jobs. For instance, even if the officiai unemployment
rate would be close to zéro, there might still be a considérable shortage
of jobs, manifested by a large number of (notably female) persons, not
entitled to social benefits, but willing to do paid work. For this reason
and by lack of a better terni I will use interchangebly the terms job
shortage or structural unemployment. It is important to note that, perhaps
contrary to the textbook définition of the term unemployment as those who
are willing, able and looking for work at the going wage rate, structural
unemployment as meant hère also includes ail those who are not doing paid
work, perhaps not even looking for work. To highlight the link between BI
and unemployment, the BI scheme will be compared with the Labour Rights
scheme as devised by Hamminga (1992; 1995), in which shortage of jobs is
the point of departure motivating the whole exereize.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, sections 2 to 4 discuss
the équivalence between a Labour Right and BI System. Section 2 briefly
outlines Hamminga's thought experiment, and in section 3 a formai model
of the Labour Rights scheme is presented. Section 4 deals with the BI
scheme. Secondly, in sections 5 and 6 the insights obtained from the analysis
are used to critically examine welfare policies during économie up- and
downturns and to evaluate the force of a popular objection against BI,
that of exploitation of hard-working citizens. The final section summarizes
and concludes.
1 For a récent overview of the potential of BI to address the new social question (the division between
job holders and non-job holders) pitted against the claims of competing policy instruments {notably wage
subsidies), and of the political chances of BI in various European countries, see van der Veen and Groot
(2000).
2 See Van Parijs (2000), which uses the term Painean justice to characterize unconditional basic social
security provided by a BI.
3 For this corrélation, see Groot and van der Veen (2000:197-9).
4 For a justification of BI along a différent line, that of compensatory justice, see Groot (2002). In the
compensatory justice case of BI unemployment also plays an important rôle.Loek Groot 225
2 Hamminga's thought experiment
In a provoking thought experiment Hamminga considère a country Eu in
which there are more workers than there are jobs available, but where
everyone is given an equal and tradable entitlement to thèse scarce job
assets.5 Thus, the basic idea behind it is simply that a fair way of dealing
with a shortage of jobs is to give everyone an equal and tradable share of
Labour Rights. Doing this avoids a first-come, fîrst-served appropriation of
jobs (and assigning a social benefit to those who lose out), as well as make
redundant measures like collective working time réduction to spread jobs
over more workers. The Labour Rights scheme can thus be considered as
a mechanism to (re)distribute unemployment in an efficient and équitable
way.6 A market of tradable Labour Rights will hâve the nice resuit that
workaholics will buy the Labour Rights of those with a low propensity to
work, against an equilibrium price at which there are no non-workers who
prefer to work, nor workers who prefer not to work and to cash in the market
value of their share of Labour Rights. Consequently, in Eu it makes no sensé
to moralize about the level of the unemployment benefit, or whether or
not able-bodied persons hâve a duty to work.7 The main advantage of this
System is that we get rid of both mvoluntary unemployment and involuntary
employment. To see this consider Table 1, which classifies the labour force
under the présent conditional System into four catégories, according to
whether one is, voluntary or involuntary, employed or unemployed.
Table 1. Classification of the labour force according to labour market and
motivational status under conditional social security (Hamminga










Given the level of the unemployment or social assistance benefit, those
in B want to be in D, while those in position C want to be in A. In the
5 In a country Eu there are five million able-bodied adult citizens, but only four million full-time jobs. The Eu-
government gives everyone four Labour Rights, but to occupy a job one need to return five Labour Rights
to the government. In total 20 million Labour Rights are issued by the government and also 20 million are
needed for the four million jobs available. The one million people choosing to be unemployed, that is, those
with a high préférence for leisure, sell their Labour Rights to those who prefer, at the prevailing market price
of Labour Rights, to work.
6 Of course, those who think that job rights should not be traded freely because everyone has a moral
obligation to work would opt for mandatory job-sharing and maintain unemployment benefits under a work
test.
7 "In Eu, there's no discussion of whether people ought to work. It is not a matter of morals or politics or ethics.
Jobs are like cars and concerts. Opting for employment is a matter of taste and your own preferred way of
enjoying life" (Hamminga 1995:26).226 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
Labour Right System it is only possible to be in A or D, because members
of C will buy the Labour Rights (and thus take over the jobs) from B and
become A's while those formerly in B move to category D. In Eu we hâve
therefore only voluntary employment and voluntary unemployment, where
the level of employment is determined by the number of jobs available, while
the level of the unemployment benefit is determined by the equilibrium price
of Labour Rights. The différent manners of how members of group D are
treated in both Systems is strikingly described by Hamminga as : "Hère,
they are often distrusted, and we tend to feel no 'responsibility' for them :
we do not want to feed them out of 'our' income for which we hâve the
decency to work. D members are also a very useful symbol and instrument
of démagogues who argue in favour of reducing unemployment benefits...
In Eu, their présence is highly appreciated. They are the hard core of the
supply side of the market in Labour Rights : they help keep down the price"
(ibid. : 32). Contrary to the présent System of social security, the préférences
of ail are reflected in the market price of Labour Rights. To sum up : "In Eu's
free market, ail thèse préférences (LG : of those originally positioned in A,
B, C or D) would be reflected in priées for which Labour Rights are bought
and sold. In our world, it is otherwise. We moralize, making it a matter
of politics and collective compromise. We concoct complicated criteria for
deciding which inactive able-bodied adult citizens may receive a benefit, for
determining the rate of the benefit, for deciding who is going to pay for it
and how much. To Eunians, we look like communists deliberately organizing
market failures for the sake of nineteenth-century morals" (ibid. : 27).
The vantage point of the thought experiment is that it offers a very
instructive device which compels us to (re)think how we treat the unem-
ployed and what rôle the distinction between involuntary and voluntary
unemployed, or between 'deserving' and 'undeserving', plays. The experi
ment also shows that if unemployment is structural so that we hâve to face a
long-lasting scarcity of jobs, the sacrifice of the workers (the price they hâve
to pay for additional Labour Rights to secure a full-time job, and in this way
pay for the unemployment benefits) mirrors the sacrifice of the unemployed
to give up their right to work.8 In discussing Hamminga's thought experi
ment, Goodin (1998:188fh) rightly notes that "What they are doing for us
is occupying slots among the unemployed that someone has to occupy, in an
economy with any appréciable level of structural unemployment ; and enem-
ployment benefits can be conceived as payments to them for that service".
The 'taxes' paid by the workers to finance social security is not because of
solidarity with the unemployed, but reflects a scarcity price which each one
choosing to work pays because of self-interest. The solidarity of this System
is so to speak a side-effect of the pursuit of self-interest by workers and non-
workers alike. Despite thèse advantages in terms of fairness and efficiency, it
is perhaps fair to say that in real world politics a full-fledged Labour Rights
8 It cannot be ruled out that the unemployment benefit wiil even be higher than the net wage of those with a
low productivity but a high préférence to work, or even higher than the average net wage - this would be the
case if to work is on balance not a sacrifice at ail.Loek Groot 227
System is far less likely to be considered as a proposai worth to be taken
seriously as an alternative to présent social security than a BI or négative
income tax scheme. However, it will be shown that a Labour Right scheme
is almost fully équivalent with a BI scheme, and therefore the advantages
of the former, listed above, apply as well to the latter scheme.
The main question to be answered then is what the level of the BI
should be when there is not enough paid work for everyone. Finding a
satisfying answer to this question is also of paramount importance to the
ongoing debate on the justice of the BI proposai. Prominent defenders of a
BI like van der Veen and van Parijs9 argue that a flat tax financed BI, at
the highest feasible level, combining the simplest possible income tax with
the simplest possible welfare System, is also the most just scheme within
the framework of liberal-egalitarian justice. Is this too good to be true ?
A quick way to answer in the affirmative is to say that a substantial BI,
sufficient to meet subsistence needs, is economically infeasible.10 For the
sake of argument, the question of économie (in)feasibility11will be ignored,
and instead I concentrate on another important, and in this context more
relevant, objection, that of exploitation. This is taken up in section 6, in
which the force of the objection is considered by relating it to the insights
gained from the comparison of the BI and Labour Rights schemes.
The Labour Rights scheme
3.1 Uniform productivity levels
In the experiment as described by Hamminga (1995, see also footnote 5
above) a homogeneous population (that is, with equal earning capacities) is
assumed, with only a choice between full-time work or full-time leisure. In
what follows, thèse simplifying assumptions will be lifted sequentially.
Consider an economy in which the maximum feasible employment
level. in proportion to the labour force, is / (so / is the ratio between the
number of full-time équivalent jobs12 and the labour force), with / < 1.
9 See van der Veen (1991) and van Parijs (1995).
10 Or some variation on this, like a BI is either too low to be socially acceptable or too high to be economically
feasible.
11 My stance is that this question is not answerable, taking into account the radical uncertainty surrounding
the effects (on human capital formation, saving, investment, profits, migration, informai work, etc.) of a 81
scheme. Based on theory and empirical research we can say something about which kinds of effects most
likely will resuit, specified by groups (e.g. low wage earners, high wage earners, welfare récipients), but
not or hardly anything about the total effects of such a major change of conditional to unconditional social
security. Bearing in mind that there is even no consensus among economists on the économie effects of a
small change in the level the statutory minimum wage, it can safely be taken for granted that economists
are not able to make a reliable prédiction of the total impact of the many effects which would be brought
about by the implementation of a BI.
12 Two part-tlme jobs of half a standard work week count as équivalent to one full-time job.228 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
The government, acknowledging this shortage of jobs, décides to give every
member of the labour force (including those not working or looking for
work) p Labour Rights, with 0 < p < / ^ 1. If someone wants to work
full-time, she has to buy an additional amount or share of (1 — p) Labour
Rights on top of the p Labour Rights which she holds already in possession.
Any worker can thus freely décide how many hours of a standard work week
to work by selling or buying the required amount of Labour Rights. Since
we first maintain the assumption of equal talents (and equal wages), the
price to be paid for additional Labour Rights {p ) can be interpreted as
a proportional tax on labour income (tu). Eunians then face the following
budget constraint :
(1) Y = [w-p]L + pp Le [0,1],
with labour supply,13 14 L :
(2) L = e[w-p) e€[0,l],
where the parameter e expresses the, individual spécifie, propensity to
perform paid work. Those with e = 0 are the most work-averse (preferring a
leisure-oriented life), while those with e = 1 are the workaholics.15 According
to Eq. (1), since each member of the workforce receives p Labour Rights at
the beginning, and given a uniform market price of p , the income resulting
from selling one's Labour Rights (so L = 0) is equal to pp . Likewise,
someone who just décides to perform paid work during a fraction p of a
full-time work week does not hâve to buy additional Labour Rights, nor has
to sell any Labour Rights, and receives income wp. Those who wish to work
longer than p (times the number of hours of a standard full-time work week)
hâve to buy additional Labour Rights. For example, a full-time worker with
L = 1 has to buy (1 — p) additional Labour Rights on top of the p Labour
Rights which this worker already holds in possession. In effect, the scheme
is essentially an auction between work-adverse and work-hungry citizens.
13 It can be easily derived thaï the labour supply function according to Eq. (2) corresponds to the utility function
2
U (Y, L) = Y — -g-, where the second term on the RHS represents the burden of work.
14 Note that this labour supply function has no income effect and a unitary elasticity with respect to the net
wage. Empirical research invariably finds that maie labour supply is rather inelastic (close to zéro), while
female labour supply is somewhat more elastic, but tts elasticity also well below unity. One can easily adjust
the labour supply function (2) for varying elasticities, through specifying L = e[w —p ] , so that the elasticity
is equal to e. However, this would make the analysis much more complicated. The main thing to bear in
mind is that the level of unemployment income (or Bl) can be much higher with inelastic labour supply than
the levels which follow from the analysis hère.
15 This way to model préférences for work and leisure in the utility function, as well as some other assumptions
made and resuits used, are the same as in Chapter 3 of the dissertation of Vandenbroucke (2001 ).Loek Groot 229
The equilibrium condition for the market of Labour Rights can be
expressed as follows :I6
(3) JLf(e)d(e)=p
stating that total labour supply must equal the employment level chosen by
the government (/(e) is the density function of parameter e). Substitution
of (2) into (3) and solving for p gives the following shorthand expression
for p , the price to be paid for a coupon of Labour Rights :
(4) p =^
Fixing the uniform wage rate at unity, and given that shortage of jobs
is the point of departure motivating the whole exercize, the price of Labour
Rights is higher, the higher is the average propensity to work ë and the
lower the chosen employment level p. (If everyone's share of Labour Rights
is higher than ê, then there is excess supply of Labour Rights, which causes
the price of a Labour Right to dwindle to zéro.17) The logic behind the
Labour Right market is that the net money income of a full-time worker will
be lower, the lower the pre-established employment share p (which makes
jobs more scarce) and the higher the average préférence to work (indicating
that many others want to work hard, which is to the advantage of those
who hâve a low préférence for working). Non-labour income, that is money
income resulting from selling one's initial share p of Labour Rights against
the market price p , is maximized for that value of p for which :
where p dénotes the participation rate which maximizes the unemploy-
ment benefit. The relationships between the unemployment benefit pp and
the market clearing price of Labour Rights and différent values of the pre-
established participation rate p, with préférences (ë) held constant, are il-
lustrated in Figure 1.
The interrupted Une shows that p is a declining function of p and
equal to zéro if p is equal to ë, and that the unemployment benefit,
p 1
16 Alternative^, one might specify this as either (3') / (p - L)f{e)d{e) = / (L - p)/(e)d(e)
0 P
or (3") / Lp f(e)d(e) = pp . According to (31), the amount of Labour Rights sold (the LHS) must equal
the amount of Labour Rights bought, where e is the propensity to work of someone who chooses to work
exactly p. Eq. (3") is the usual balanced budget, stating that (tax) revenues must equal social outlays.
17 If ë < p, the price of Labour Rights would become négative only if everyone is enforœd to exercize the
Labour Rights, that is either to work more than some may want to or to find someone who is prepared to
take over Labour Rights.230 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
Figure 1 : The price of Labour Rights (p ) and the level of the unemploy-






represented by the solid Une, shows a hump-shaped curve. For p less than
p , the price of Labour Rights is high because jobs are scarce, but anyone
choosing not to work has only a small share p of Labour Rights to sell to
those who want to work more than their share. One can also take it in this
way, that for a low p there are relatively few workers doing paid work and
many abstaining from paid work, which implies a low average income for
both workers and non-workers. If p is higher than p , e.g., close to ë, then
jobs are not so scarce and the price for a Labour Rights is consequently low.
The fact that non-workers can sell a larger share of Labour Rights compared
to the situation where p is equal to p does not compensate the lower
price of Labour Rights.
To summarize, given the value of ê, we can détermine the share of
Labour Rights (p ) to be distributed equally to ail which maximizes the
non-labour unemployment income (p p ). However, so far nothing is
said about whether to choose the participation rate which maximizes the
unemployment benefit is also just. It may well be that the maximum feasibleLoek Groot 231
overall employment level or participation rate is far higher than the rather
low participation rate which maximizes the unemployment benefit. Note
that the pre-established participation rate p détermines how large a share
of a full-time job right each member of the labour force receives. According
to Eq. (4), the market price p for a Labour Right approaches zéro if p
approaches ë. It is favourable to those with a high préférence for work if
the government sets the overall participation rate close to the maximum
feasibie rate, while the hard core of the voluntary unemployed would favour
a participation rate which is close to the rate p which maximizes their
unemployment benefit. The question then arises which rate the government
must choose.18 Instead of artificially constraining the number of jobs in order
to maximize the unemployment benefit, it is perfectly équitable to choose
the feasibie employment level /. whatever its level turns out to be. If / is far
higher than p , we feel sorry for the leisure-lovers, but they hâve no valid
complaint. Equally, if / is equal to or close to p , we feel sorry for the
workaholics, but they hâve no valid complaint either. In both cases, everyone
has equal access to jobs, and given equal productive talents, everyone has
also equal opportunities to convert leisure into money income. There is no
injustice. This issue is taken up again in section 4 when discussing the BI
scheme.
3.2 Non-uniform productivity
If the assumption of equal earning capacities (a uniform w) is removed,
we encounter the problem that in the original set up of the experiment
the price to be paid for additional shares of Labour Rights is essentially a
tax imposed on workers proportional to working time, but not proportional
to their earning capacity. It thereby violâtes an important principle of tax
equity, namely that everyone pays according to one's means. For someone
with a rather low earning capacity, but a high préférence to work, the tax in
the form of the price of additional Labour Rights may constitute a serious
obstacle to choose the option of full-time work, whereas for someone with
an extremely high earning capacity, it is not more than a tip. In order to
circumvent this problem, just assume that ail workers pay a tax proportional
to their earning capacity w and their labour supply. Accordingly, the budget
constraint and labour supply function become :
(6) Y=[(l-t)w]L + pp we[w ,1],
and
(7) L = e[(l-t)w]
18 This problem turns out to be quite tricky, not only because of the opposing interests of workaholics and
leisure-lovers. For instance, the maximum feasibie rate is higher if the conditions to classify jobs offered
by empioyers as proper jobs, are Ioose : do we count the jobs offered by an employer who wants to start a
peep-show as proper jobs? Again, it is in the interest of those with a low attachment to paid work to hâve
rather strict criteria (which brings the pre-established rate doser to p ), while it is in the interests of
full-time workers and empioyers that rather Ioose criteria are used.232 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
According to (6), those who choose not to work receive unemployment
benefits reflecting the scarcity value of jobs, and ail workers pay for
appropriating scarce job assets in proportion to earning income. Someone
who works full-time is a net tax récipient or contributor dépendent on
whether (earning power related) taxes paid (tw) is smaller or greater than
the uniform benefits received (pp ).
Now the equilibrium condition for the market for Labour Rights and
the balanced budget no longer coïncides (see footnote 16). Instead, we hâve
two separate conditions :
(8) J J Lf(e)f(w)d(e)d(w)=p
and
(9) / / twLf{e)f(w)d{e)d(w) = pp
Eq. (8) describes that aggregate labour supply must be equal to the
employment level p, and Eq. (9) that tax revenues (the LHS) must equal
total social expenditures (the RHS). For simplicity, assume that e and w are
distributed independently. Substituting (7) into (8) and solving for t gives :
(10) t = 1 - -^r
and solving (9) :19
(11) pp = ët{l - t)(w2 + <t2)
For those who want to live merely from the proceeds of selling Labour
Rights, the tax rate which maximizes their non-labour income can be derived
from :
corresponding to (see Eq. (10)) pmax = ëw/2, the same as we found in
the case of a homogeneous workforce, except that the uniform wage rate
w is now replaced by the average productivity w. However, it is far from
obvious that an egalitarian government, faced with the problem of scarcity
of jobs, should aim at maximizing the income of those who want to indulge
in leisure. Instead, the maximin objective requires to maximize the income of
the group of least advantaged (those with the lowest productivity level w ),
19 Making use of the fact thaï / w2f{w)d(w) =Loek Groot . 233
and to weight préférences impartially. Doing this requires (the subscript L
dénotes the lowest productivity level) :
(13) max / Y = max /[(l - t)w }L + pp
Substituting (7) for L and (11) for pp in (13) and differentiating with
respect to t gives :
(14) t* - 1 - (®2 + *2)
so for w > 0, t* is lower than t . It can easily be checked (by solving
Eq. (14) for t* = 0) that as w approaches w, so that a2 gets smaller and
smaller, t* tends to zéro : if ail hâve more or less the same productivity w,
and the same access to jobs, then there is no rationale for taxation and
redistribution. At the other extrême, if w is zéro, the least productive
are not able to capture any labour income, so the best thing for them to
do is to sell their Labour Rights, and the best thing for an egalitarian
government to do for them is to set the tax rate at the Laffer turning
point t which maximizes non-labour income. The higher the value of w ,
the lower the required tax rate to achieve the maximin objective (13), and
therefore (see Eq. (10)), the doser the employment level p approaches the
maximum feasible level /. Admittedly, to ration artificially the employment
level below the maximum feasible level is probably an outcome hard to
swallow, especially if we bear in mind that the whole exercise départs from
the presumption that scarcity of jobs is the main problem. For several
reasons this outcome is nonetheless acceptable. Firstly, suppose that instead
of rationing the employment level the government would allow everyone to
work as much, but not more, as what corresponds to everyone's legitimate
share of Labour Rights. This would amount to giving each member of the
labour force an untradable share of Labour Rights equal to the feasible rate
/. This measure is équivalent with a compulsory working time réduction
of ail full-time jobs of (1 - /) percent. It is clear that there will be ample
room for Pareto-improvements if Labour Rights would be tradable : those
wanting to work longer than / hours of a standard work week would be
eager to pay a price for additional Labour Rights from those who want
to work less than / hours. It is the tradability of Labour Rights which
ensures that ail possible Pareto-improvements can be realized. Therefore,
in a world of equal entitlement to job rights to deal with job shortage there
is an efficiency case for the Labour Rights scheme. Secondly, the fact that
p < f only results because the government wants to maximize the income
of the least advantaged. In a sensé, then, the divergence between / and p
can be interpreted as the cost in terms of employment of providing social
security, with / the employment level in an economy without any or only
minimal social security. One more reason why the resuit of putting a ceiling
to the employment level should not bother us at this moment has to do with234 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
the fact that it is only a thought experiment. As will be shown in the next
section, the problem does not show up in this guise under an équivalent BI
scheme.
4 The équivalent basic income scheme
4.1 Uniform productivity levels
A flat tax BI scheme (or a single tiered NIT scheme) is fully characterized by
two parameters : the level of the BI (or the NIT income guarantee) and the
tax rate.20 Below, the set of équations describing a BI scheme are presented,
where apostrophes are used to indicate the équivalence with the model with
Labour Rights. The budget constraint under a BI scheme is :
(1') Y = Ml " t)]L + B
with B denoting basic income. The labour supply function (2) does not
change except that (w — p ) becomes w(l - t), and instead of Eq. (3) we
hâve the balanced budget équation :
(30 / twL = B,
which gives :
(4') B = ë[t(l-t)w2],
Differentiating Eq. (4') with respect to t gives the B-maximizing tax rate
t =^- Using Eq. (2), the participation rate corresponding to this tax
rate is J (L\t = \) = -jj-, the same value as we found before in the scheme
of Labour Rights. The relation between B, L and the tax rate is shown in
Figure 2.
It can easily be verified that Eq. {V)\s équivalent with Eq. (1) above
if tw is equal to p and B is equal to pp . Dénote t as the tax rate which
realizes a participation rate of p. so :
L\t =p=> ëw{l -t ) =p=ï t w = — = p
which estabiishes the formai équivalence between both schemes. The only
différence between both schemes is this : in the Labour Rights scheme
the government must choose beforehand the participation rate p (which
20 See Atkinson (1995) for an extensive treatment of the Bl/flat tax proposai.Loek Groot 235
Figure 2 : The level of basic income B and labour supply L as a function




détermines how large a share of tradable job rights everyone is granted),
which in turn détermines, given ë, the value of p (the 'tax rate') and hence
the level of the unemployment benefit; under the BI scheme, the government
lias to décide beforehand which tax rate to impose, which as a matter of
fact simultaneously détermines the overall participation rate and the level
of B. In the former scheme, the participation rate p is taken as an exogenous
variable while the 'tax rate' p and the level of the unemployment benefit
are endogenous;in the latter scheme the tax rate is exogenous, while the
participation rate and the level of B are endogenous.
The right procédure for the government to follow is to choose a tax
rate tQ, and to check whether there are still vacancies left (so /0 > L at
t = t0, see Figure 2). If so, the tax level and the level of B are too high,
causing labour supply to be insuflficient to fill ail jobs available. Next, lower
the tax rate (to iL) as well as B, so inducing a higher labour supply, until
ail job vacancies are disappeared. If, on the other hand, at t = £0, there are
people searching in vain for a job (so f0 < L at t = t0), then labour supply
is too high compared to the number of jobs. To reach equilibrium on the236 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
labour market, the government can raise the level of t as well as B, inducing
a décline in labour supply, until labour supply matches labour demand. In
conformity with the Labour Rights System (see Table 1 in section 2), at the
market clearing levels of t and B, there is now only voluntary unemployment
and voluntary employment.
4.2 Non-uniform productivity
With unequal talents, we can simply maintain Eqs. (1') and (31), but
interpret w as a varying parameter. Solving (3S) gives :
(11') B = ët(l - t)(w2 + <r2),
so the tax rate that maximizes B is t = \. By equating J j L = p =>■
t = 1 - —. which matches exactly Eq. (10) of the Labour Rights System, it
follows that labour supply at t = \ is equal to ëw/2. Given that both
Systems are équivalent, it will not come as a surprise that solving Eq. (13),
with pp replaced by B, that is maximizing average income of the group
with lowest productivity, yields the same tax rate t* as expressed in Eq.
(14).
5 Welfare policy and économie up- and downturns
Now that we hâve some insight in the functioning of a Labour Rights and
the équivalent BI scheme, it is interesting to see how thèse schemes react
to exogenous économie shocks, compared to how welfare policy usually
accommodâtes changes in the économie environment. It is taken for granted
that labour demand is always the short side of the labour market (for most
European countries, this is a plausible assumption for already more than two
décades). Under a Labour Rights scheme, a positive shock to the economy
would allow the government to set the participation rate p at a higher value,
leading to a décline in the level of the unemployment benefit21 (provided
p > p ). In ternis of Figure 1, the economy moves further to the right,
away from p . Under a BI scheme, a positive shock (an increase in labour
demand at prevailing wages) effects a décline in the level of B. In ternis of
Figure 2, the tax rate must be set at a lower level to foster labour supply
in order to absorb higher labour demand, so the economy moves to the left,
e.g. from to to ii, away from t . This may come as a surprise, but it is in
line with the central assertion of the analysis that the legitimate level of B
is lower, the lower the level of unemployment due to shortage of jobs. The
limiting case is where there is no shortage of jobs at ail, in which case the
21 Which is of course necessary to stimulate labour supply, or in terms of Table 1, to give some members of
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legitimate level of B is nil under the assumption of equal talents.22 Under
the existent conditional welfare scheme, a positive shock also reduces the
number of unemployed. The différence is that a lower unemployment rate
removes somewhat the pressure to lower social benefits : if anything, the
higher tax revenues and lower social security outlays allows in principle to
raise the social benefit and to lower tax rates.
In an économie downturn, this picture is reversed. Under a Labour
Rights System, the participation rate déclines and unemployment benefits
increase (which is necessary to induce more workers (members of group A
according to Table 1) to voluntarily abstain from paid work and to become
voluntarily unemployed (D)). The same is true under the équivalent BI
scheme : a higher tax rate is required to reduce total labour supply until
it equals labour demand (which as a resuit of the économie downturn
decreases). Under both schemes, the economy moves closer to p (again,
provided the participation rate before the shock occurs was higher than
p ). The usual welfare policy, the best remedy under the existent social
security scheme so to speak, to overcome an économie downturn and the
problems this poses for the welfare state is to curtail social benefits. Why ?
The first reason one can think of is that lower social benefits effects
a higher labour supply because it is usually assumed that the latter varies
inversely with the replacement ratio. However, even if ail unemployment
before the shock occurs was voluntary, this measure is unnecessary because
some workers will lose their job and become involuntary unemployed.
An économie downturn will thus inevitably, even if social benefit levels
are maintained. create involuntary unemployment (exerting a downward
pressure on wages) which suggests that it is unnecessary to further stimulate
(excess) labour supply and downward pressure on wages through cutting
social benefits. The second reason is that higher unemployment exerts an
upward pressure on tax rates because of increasing social security outlays,
which in turn raises gross wages (and hence would even aggravate the
décline in labour demand, leading to a vicuous circle). This kind of reasoning
implicitly assumes that those who remain at work do not accept a décline
in net wages despite the économie downturn. If this is true (and this is
very plausible, since insiders hâve sufficient power and job security to refuse
net wage cuts), it means that only the unemployed must carry the burden
of overcoming the économie downturn : lower social benefits allows lower
tax rates and, given the level of net wages, lower gross wage costs for
employers. To be sure, the économie downturn can then only be overcome
when the higher labour supply and lower tax rates indeed lead to lower
gross wage levels. To summarize, the différence in adjustment to a négative
shock between the Labour Rights and BI scheme on the one hand and the
welfare policy under the existent scheme on the other is that the former
schemes just try to make ail (un)employment voluntary (which requires
22 Or positive in ihe case of unequal talents, not because of shortage of jobs, but merely because the
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higher unemployment benefits and lower net wages for workers), while the
latter always tries to return to a state of full employment (whether voluntary
or involuntary), if necessary by means of cutting social benefits.23 Under
the Labour Rights and BI schemes, at each level of unemployment the
unemployment benefit or BI is set at that level at which ail (un)employed are
in that position voluntarily ; the higher the level of structural unemployment,
the higher the required level of income for the unemployed to induce
sufficient workers to choose for unemployment.
6 Exploitation
The exploitation objection against BI, formulated by Elster (1986:719),
runs as follows : "Most workers would, correctly in my opinion, see the
proposai as a recipe for the exploitation of the industrious by the lazy".
The exploitation objection must be distinguished from the reciprocity-based
parasitism-objection, which says 'no benefit without work' (see e.g. White
1997). In the latter, the reciprocity-based duty to work (those who can work
should not be entitled to social benefits) is at stake, while in the former the
lower standard of living of workers in virtue of supporting the parasites
is involved. However, if there is a shortage of jobs, and no shortage of
qualified workers prepared to occupy thèse jobs, it makes less sensé to force
unemployed workers to meet the demands of reciprocity. Probably White
(1997: 82) might accord with this view since he writes : "Since it is only fair
to insist on satisfaction of the reciprocity principle if there are sufficient
opportunities for citizens to do so, it would arguably become unfair to
continue to affirm the principle were we unable to return to full employment
(in an appropriately modernised sensé). The case for citizen's income (basic
income) would then be correspondingly stronger." If one nevertheless wants
to hold fast to the demands of reciprocity, then the workaholic must give
up part of his full-time job.
Needless to say, the framework expounded in the previous sections also
offers an exquisite opportunity to evaluate the merits of the exploitation
objection, even more than the parasitism objection. As a first reply one
might say that under a BI (or Labour Rights) scheme any worker has
the opportunity to choose a fully leisurely life-style, so those workers
who feel exploited can immediately switch to a situation with full-time
leisure. This reply will not do, because it is just the moral rightness of
providing unconditional income transfers paid for by others which is at
stake. Moreover, in the counterfactual case that indeed everyone would take
this opportunity, there is no BI to dispense. The real interesting question
23 Note that the relevance of this conclusion, and also of this paper, becomes much greater if we interpret the
existing social benefits as conditional on means only, while the work-test is merely formai (to fulfil the formai
duty to work, the unemployed only hâve to visit regurlarly the job centre to see that no job vacancies cornes
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is therefore to figure out what reasonable complaints workers may hâve
when the BI turns out to be economically feasible, that is, at a level where
enough persons want to convert leisure time into additional money income
(on top of their BI) by means of paid labour (and so keeping that level
of BI economically sustainable). Van der Veen (1991: 203) replies that "...
disgruntled workers hâve no valid moral complaints against the behaviour
of their non-working fellows under a genuinely sustainable universal grant".
Now disgruntled workers are those who décide "... to stay in the workforce,
even though they would rather quit, [is] explained by the moral motivation
of not wanting to be parasitic" (ibidem.). In other words, thèse workers do
hâve the same préférences regarding work and leisure as those who choose
full-time leisure, except that they do not want to live off others labour.
Hamminga's experiment is of great help hère since under a conditional
scheme there is no possibility to test how sincère the opinions of the
disgruntled workers are, while the sincerity and the alleged ubiquity of
thèse opinions among workers are put to a real test if Hamminga's proposai
for freely tradable Labour Rights in the circumstance of scarcity of jobs is
carried out. It might well turn out that the alleged disgruntled workers under
a Labour Rights scheme would quickly choose the option to full-time leisure
by selling their Labour Rights, if only because this is a perfectly legitimate
move under that scheme, and therefore do not attach much importance
to the notion that it is morally suspect to live ofF others labour (which,
according to Hamminga, is the officiai work ethic uphold by the existing
work- and means-tested scheme of social security).
Returning to the Labour Rights scheme, if there is a scarcity of
jobs due to structural unemployment, we saw that there is room for an
unconditional income entitlement, even for those who voluntarily choose to
be idle. However, to set it at the highest durably sustainable level (financed
by the single proportional tax rate which yields the highest tax revenues,
hence the highest feasible unemployment benefit or BI) might be unjust to
(and indeed exploiting) ail those who want to work hard. The tax rate
corresponding to the case where the government tries to maximize the
income of the least advantaged, while taking into account the scarcity of
jobs, need not be equal to, and probably will be less than, the tax yield
and BI maximizing rate. This means that in thèse circumstances there
exists a positive level of the unemployment benefit or BI, albeit less than
the highest feasible level, which can withstand Elster's objection : it is not
because they are industrious that they hâve to pay taxes, but because they
want to appropriate more than their legitimate share of scarce job assets.
and additionally, in the case of unequal talents, because of the required
amount of redistribution to improve the position of the least advantaged.
Of course, this resuit only applies to the extent that job scarcity justifies
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7 Summary and conclusion
The analysis of this paper is entirely concernée! with scarce job assets.
However, this methodology of granting equal and tradable rights can be
transposed to other areas. For instance, the same approach can be adopted
if we are concerned with a just distribution of pollution rights.
The aim of the analysis performed is to investigate whether there is a
relation between unemployment and BI. As a starting point it is assumed
that for one reason or the other there is scarcity of jobs. The main question
is what workers hâve to pay to appropriate (scarce) jobs assets. Hamminga's
proposai to deal with scarcity of jobs is to give each member of the labour
force an equal and tradable right to thèse scarce job assets. It is shown that
such a Labour Right System is équivalent with a BI scheme, with the only
différence that in the former the level of employment (or participation rate)
is exogenous and the 'tax rate' endogenous, whereas under the BI scheme
it is the other way around. The équivalence consists in that the price of
Labour Rights and the level of the unemployment benefit corresponds to
the proportional tax rate and the level of BI respectively. In other words,
the single proportional tax rate of a BI scheme can be considered as what
workers hâve to pay to appropriate scarce job assets (and, with unequal
talents, for meeting the redistributional objective). Both schemes allow
that some people voluntarily abstain from doing paid work, in return for a
financial compensation, an unemployment benefit or a BI.
Starting from no scarcity of jobs at ail, the level of the unemployment
benefit or BI varies positively with the degree of scarcity of jobs until the
maximum value is reached. The overall participation rate corresponding
with the maximum value of the unemployment benefit or BI is rather low,
certainly when compared with the average préférence to do paid work.
There is, however, no reason to choose for the maximum sustainable BI.
Under equality of talents, the government can simply choose the level of
employment which it deems feasible, and let the market in Labour Rights
détermine the level of the unemployment benefit. Under the BI scheme, the
government can set the proportional tax rate (and the level of B) at the
level at which the labour market clears.
The bottom Une of the analysis is that the level of BI varies positively
with the level of unemployment : more severe scarcity of jobs requires a
higher tax rate (and hence a higher BI) to adjust the total labour supply
downwards to the number of jobs available. The level of the BI also varies
positively with the average préférence to work. The logic behind this is that,
given the tax rate, more people voluntarily choose to work if the average
préférence towards work is higher. So in a society with a strong work ethic
it is possible to hâve a high BI as well as a high level of employment.Loek Groot __^_ 241
Références
Atkinson, A.B. (1995), Public Economies in Action. The Basic Income/Flat
Tax Proposai, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Elster, J. (1986), "Comment on Van der Veen and Van Parijs", Theory and
Society, 15, pp. 709-722.
Elster, J. (1989), Solomonic Judgements, Cambridge University Press.
Groot, L. and R. van der Veen (2000), "Clues and Leads in the Policy
Debate on Basic Income in the Netherlands", in Robert van der Veen
and Loek Groot (eds.), Basic Income on the Agenda : Policy Objectives
and Political Chances, Amsterdam University Press, pp. 197-223.
Groot, L.F.M. (2002), Basic Income and Compensatory Justice, Journal of
Social Philosophy, 33 (1), pp. 141-161.
Hamminga, B. (1992), Could Jobs be like Cars and Concerts ?, unpublished.
Hamminga, B. (1995). "Demoralizing the Labour Market : Could Jobs be
like Cars and Concerts ?", The Journal of Political Philosophy, 3,
pp. 23-35.
Schmidtz, D. and R. Goodin (1998), Social Welfare and Individual Respon-
sibility, Cambridge University Press.
Vandenbroucke, F. (2001), Social Justice and Individual Ethics in an Open
Society : Equality, Responsibility, and Incentives, Berlin, Springer-
Verlag.
Van der Veen, R.J. (1991), Between Exploitation and Communism. Explo
rations in the Marxian Theory of Justice and Freedom, Groningen,
Wolters-Noordhoff.
Van der Veen, R. and L. Groot (eds.) (2000), Basic Income on the Agenda :
Policy Objectives and Political Chances, Amsterdam University Press.
Van Parijs, Ph. (1995), Real Freedom for All:What (if Anything) Can
Justify Capitalism ?, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Van Parijs. Ph. (2000), "Delivering a Basic Income : Philippe van Parijs
Responds", Boston Review : New Democracy Forum, Oct/Nov.
Weitzman, M.L. (1984), The Share Economy : Conquering Stagflation, Cam
bridge, Harvard University Press.
White, S. (1997), "Libéral Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an
Unconditional Basic Income", Political Studies, XLV, pp. 312-326.